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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
the weight of authority, 3 is the better view. Conceding that this permits
discrimination, it seems that the opposite rule would be even more unjust,
in that it would discriminate against residents of a municipality who are, in
reality, bearing the greater burden of paying for the service. Since a munici-
pality cannot tax non-residents, it should at least be able to demand higher
utility rates, and it certainly should not be saddled with the burden of show-
ing that the rates established are not unreasonable. rhat burden should be
left with the party alleging it.14
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS - EFFECT OF COUNTER
SIGNATURE ON FORGED INDORSEMENT - IMPLIED
VALIDATION
Appellant, check-cashing service, sent appellce's check, drawn by its
president, but not counter-signed,' through for collection. Drawee bank
secured the signature of appellee's comptroller, and paid appellant's bank.
Appellant, upon notice of the deposit, paid value for the check. Upon
discovery that check bore a forged indorsement, appellee instituted action to
determine the respective rights to the fund. Held, for appellant. Where a
co-signer signs a check bearing a forged indorsement, the co-signer impliedly
guarantees the validity of the endorsement, and "engages that on due
presentment the instrument will be accepted or paid, or both . *"2 Block
v. Howard Sober Inc., 60 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1952).
Generally, a forged indorseient passes no title,3 even if the subsequent
transferee is a bona fide holder without notice.4 The drawer of a check can
recover monies paid on a forged indorseinent from the drawee or any
subsequent holder of the check.,' The drawee bank, unable to charge the
13. Supra note 4.
14. Durant v. City of Beverly Hills, 102 P.2d 759 (Cal. 1940); Cooper v. Tampa
Electric Co., 154 Fla. 410, 17 So.2d 785 (1944); Louisville & Jefferson County Metropol-
itan Sewer Dist. v. 1. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 307 Ky. 413, 211 S.W.2d 122 (1948).
1. 5A MIIIIE, BANKS AND BANKING § 171 (1950) (bank cannot pay a check
requiring a counter-signature if one is lacking. The check is invalid).
2. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 61; FLA. STAT. § 674.63 (1951).
3. Ocala Nat. Farm Loan Ass'n v. Munro & Chambliss Nat. Bank, 89 Fla. 242,
103 So. 609 (1925); Hayes v. Midland Credit Co., 173 Minn. 554, 218 N.W. 106
(1928).
4. Warren v. Smith, 35 Utah 455, 100 Pac. 1069 (1909). But ef. United States v.
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 293 U.S. 340 (1934).
5. Farmers' State Bank in Merkel v. United States, 62 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1932);
Seidman v. North Camden Trust Co., 122 N.J.L. 580, 7 A.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1939);
Talbot v. Bank of Rochester, 1 Hill 295 (N.Y. 1841); Labor Bank & Trust Co. v. Adam,
23 S.W.2d 814 (TeK. Civ. App. 1930). See BEUrEL'S BRANNAN, NEGorIABLE INSTRU-
MENT LAw 445 (7th ed. 1948).
6. Borserine v. Maryland Casualty Co., 112 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1940); Talbot v.
Bank of Rochester, 1 Hill 295 (N.Y. 1841); Life Ins. Co. of Virginia v. Edisto Nat.
Bank of Orangeburg, 166 S.C. 505, 165 S.E. 178 (1932); United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co, v. First Nat. Bank of El Paso, 93 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
CASES NOTED
drawer's account,7 can recover from persons who received payment.8 Money
paid on a forged indorsement cannot be recovered where it would be
inequitable, especially where the plaintiff is negligent in making the pay-
ment. This doctrine is derived from the rule that a holder of a forged
instrument cannot enforce payment "unless the party, against whom it is
sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery." 10
Precluded is synonymous with estoppel." Although some courts have
construed "preclude" to include the ratification of forgeries, 2 this doctrine
has been generally repudiated.' 3 The defendant is estopped from asserting
the defense of forgery where his own negligence made the forgery possible,14
or in circumstances tantamount to an order to pay,' or where defendant
knew of the forgery and delayed in notice to prevent subsequent forgeries.16
In the instant case, the court reasoned that since "life is fused into
7. United States v. Nat. Bank of Commerce of Seattle, 205 Fed. 433 (9th Cir.
191T3); Ellis Weaving Mills v. Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank of Spartanburg, 91 F.
Supp. 943 (W.D. S.C.), aff'd, 184 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1950). 5B MICHIE, BANKS AND
BANKING § 277a (1950). See note 5 supra. The bank is liable to the depositor for
money paid on checks bearing forged indorsements, unless the drawer is estopped from
recovery.
8. Borserine v. Maryland Casualty Co., 112 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1940); United
States v. Nat. Rockland Bank, 35 F. Stpp. 812 (D. Mass. 1940); United States Nat.
Bank of Portland v. Union Bank of Philadelphia, 268 Pa. 147, 110 Atl. 792 (1920);
People's Bank v. Franklin, 88 Tenn. 299, 12 S.W. 716 (1889); Vagliano v. Bank of
England, 23 Q.B. Div. 243 [1889].
9. United States v. National Rockland Bank, 35 F. Supp. 912 (D. Mass. 1940);
Hardy v. Chesapeake Bank, 51 Md. 562 (1879); Murphy v. Metropolitan Nat. Bank,
191 Mass. 159, 77 N.E. 693 (1932).
10. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 23; lrh. STAT. § 674.25 (195-1) (emphasis
supplied).
11. Baskett v. Ohio Valley Banking & Trust Co., 214 Ky. 41, 281 S.W. 1022 (1926);
Shoemakersville First Nat. Bank v. Albright, 111 Pa. Super. 392, 170 Atl. 370 (1934).
See BEUTEL'S BRANNAN, NEGETIABLE INSTRUMENT LAW 455-456 (7th ed. 1948).
12. Coral Cables, Inc. v. Granara, 285 Mass. 565, 189 N.E. 604 (1934); Stradcr v.
Haley, 216 Minn. 315, 12 N.'V.2d 608 (1944); Denison Cholson Dry Goods Co. v.
Hill, 135 Tenn. 60, 185 S.V. 723 (1916). See BEUTEL'S BRANNAN, NEcOTIABLE
INSTRUMENT LAw 455-456 (7th ed. 1948).
13. Anderson v. Mechanics Loan & Saving Co., 58 Ga. App. 147, 198 S.E. 87 (1938);
Union Trust Co. v. Soble, 64 A.2d 744 (Md. 1949); Bank of Commerce of Louisville v.
McCarty, 119 Neb. 795, 231 N.W. 34 (1930); Johnson v. First Nat. Bank of Beaver
Falls, 367 Pa. 459, 81 A.2d 95. (1951); Shoemakersville First Nat. Bank v. Albright,
111 Pa. Super. 392, 170 At. 370 (3934); Morris Plan Bank v. Continental Nat. Bank
of Fort Worth, 155 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Merchants' Bank v. People's
Bank, 99 W.Va. 544, 130 S.E. 142 (1925). See BEurEL's BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENT LAw 455-456 (7th ed. 1948).
14. Basch v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n, 22 Cal.2d 316, 139 P.2d 1
(1943); American Sash & Door Co. v. Commerce Trust Co., 332 Mo. 98, 56 S.W.2d
1034 (1932); Land Title Bank v. Cheltenham Nat. Bank, 362 Pa. 30, 66 A.2d 768
(1949).
15. Basch v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n. 22 Cal.2d 316, 139 P.2d I
(1943); Smith v. Mechanics & Traders Bank, 6 La. Ann. 610 (1857); Dodge v. Nat.
Exchange Bank, 20 Ohio St. 234 (1870); Litchfield Shuttle Co. v. Cumberland Valley
Nat. Bank, 134 Tenn. 379, 183 S.W. 1006 (1916).
16. United States v. Washington Loan & Trust Co., 47 F. Supp. 25 (D. D.C.
1942); National Surety Co. v. Bank of the Manhattan Co., 133 Misc. 48, 231 N.Y.
Supp. 389 (Sup. Ct. 1928); Market St. Title & Trust Co. v. Chelten Trust Co., 296 Pa.
230, 145 Atl. 848 (1929).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
the check by the one who finally signs,"' 7 the comptroller's signature vali-
dated the check, and by allowing it to be paid, the drawer guaranteed its
genuineness. 18 Thus the drawer admits "the existence of the payee and his
then capacity to indorse,"'19 and that the execution of the check with the
payee's indorsement thereon, was an implied acknowledgement of the
genuineness of the indorsement.
It is submitted that the court might also have found that appellee,
drawer, was estopped from recovery on the check because the comptroller's
signature was equivalent to an order to pay without reference to the genuine-
ness of the indorsements2 0  However, the court did note appellee's irregular
business methods and equitably refused recovery by placing the financial
burden upon the person who had the last opportunity to avoid the loss.
REAL PROPERTY - TITLES - SURVIVAL OF EASEMENT
UNDER TAX SALE
Defendant acquired the tax-sale title to an alleyway which had been
subject to easements by appurtenant property owners, and attempted to halt
the use of the easements. Held, the tax sale of a servient estate does not
extinguish an appurtenant dominant easement. Engel v. Catucci, 197 F.2d
597 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
Generally, by statute, a tax deed of delinquent property is in the nature
of a new and independent grant from the sovereign and vests a new and
absolute title in fee in the purchaser.' However, a large majority of the
jurisdictions which so provide, hold that an appurtenant easement survives
a tax sale of the property.2 Some states make specific statutory provision
that appurtenant easements will survive.3 This is based on the theory that
the easement is not taxed with the servient estate, but is carved out of the
property and is separate from it. The easement is taxed with the dominant
17. Goodyear Tire & R. Co. v. Wells Fargo & U.T. Co., 1 Cal. App.2d 694, 37 P.2d
483, 489 (1934); Globe Indemnity Co. v. First Nat. Bank in St. Louis, 133 S.W.2d
1066, 1072 (Mo. 1939).
18. Horstman v. Henshaw, 11 How. 177 (1850); Cogill v. The American Exchange
Bank, I N.Y. (Comstock) 113 (1847); Meacher v. Fort, 3 Hill (S.C.) 227 (1837).
TIhe drawer of a bill affirms the genuineness of the forged indorsement by passing the
bill into circulation. But cf. Robarts v. Tucker, 13 Q.B. 560, 117 Eng. Reprints 994(1851). See 2 MORSE, BANrS AND BANKING § 477 (5th ed. 1917).
19. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 61; FLA. STAT. § 674.63 (1951).
20. See note 15 supra.
I. Rist v. Toole County, 117 Mont. 426, 159 P.2d 340 (1945); Polenz v. City of
Ravenna, 145 Neb. 845, 18 N.W.2d 510 (1945); Warren v. Blackman, 62 S.D. 26, 250
N.W. 681 (1933). Contra: Cornett v. Swift Coal and Timber Co., 112 F.2d 387 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 659 (1940); Gunter v. Townsend, 202 Ala. 160, 79 So. 644
(1918); City of Beckley v. Hatcher, 67 S.E.2d 20 (W.Va. 1951).
2. Ross v. Franko, 139 Ohio St. 395, 40 N.E.2d 664 (1942). Also Kan., N.H., N.J.,
N.M., Ohio, Okla,, Ore., Pa., Utah and Wisc.
3. MAss. GEm. LAws, c. 60, § 45 (1932); N.Y. TAx LAw § 154, IowA CODE§ 448.3 (1949) (restrictive covenants will survive).
